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Abstract
‘Smart’ imaginaries have been enthusiastically embraced by urban planners and policymakers
around the world. Indians are no exception. Between 2015–2018, following national govern-
ment guidelines to use participatory and inclusive processes, many cities developed proposals
for a smart city challenge. Successful proposals received financial and technical support from
the national government. We examine the making of the smart city proposal submitted by New
Town Kolkata (NTK). We ask how (un)democratic was the making of the proposal, along three
aspects: distributive, participatory, and responsive. Based on an analysis of documents and
interviews with policymakers and citizens, we find that NTK’s smart city imaginary largely
failed to be distributive. It rarely accounted for the specific needs of poorer and vulnerable
citizens. City officials invested considerable effort in using participatory techniques, but citizen
participation was tightly controlled through top-down design and practice of the techniques.
The latter often facilitated one-way flow of information from the city administration to the
citizens. The proposal was responsive to some citizens’ voices, but only those belonging to
the more affluent classes. A messy diversity of citizens’ voices was thus closed down, as the
city officials filtered and cherry-picked citizens’ voices that were well-aligned with the official
technocratic vision of ‘global’ smart urbanism. The paper shows how democracy can be put in
the service of technocracy, within a rhetoric of citizen participation and social inclusion that
embodies smart urbanism.
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Democracy in India is in decline (The Economist, 2020; The Guardian, 2021). People are
being silenced or marginalised, if they are seen as not fitting into the visions of the future
designed by the powerful. Some cases of silencing and marginalisation, such as criminalisa-
tion of the government’s critics (HRW, 2016, 2021), lay bare the authoritarian tendencies
underpinning Indian democratic governance. In other cases, the suppression of unfitting
voices can occur within a rhetoric of citizen participation and social inclusion adopted by
the government. We focus on the latter suppression within participation, by studying the
making of a ‘smart city’ imaginary in Kolkata, as part of the National government’s 2014
Mission to develop hundred smart cities (Roy, 2016).
Smart city developments around the world are criticised for being inherently technocratic
and exclusionary, while extending neoliberal control by large multinational corporations of
urban development (Cardullo and Kitchin, 2019; Hollands, 2015). Moving beyond critique,
scholars describe alternative forms of smartness (McFarlane and S€oderstr€om, 2017), where
concerns of democracy such as participation and inclusiveness are central. Focusing on the
participatory making of a smart city proposal from New Town Kolkata (NTK), West
Bengal, we contribute to the literature by showing how technocracy and control operate
within ostensibly democratic processes (cf. Arora et al., 2020).
We focus on three questions. First, how does the proposal envision the distribution of
smart city benefits to citizens of different social groups? Second, how participatory is the
proposal in its making, by affording possibilities to raise divergent and dissenting voices to
marginalised citizens? Third, is the proposal responsive towards the voices of the marginal-
ised? To address these questions, we focus on urban mobility aspects of NTK’s proposal.
Mobility is considered central to smart city discourses (Khanna and Khanna, 2015: 40).
We approach smart city proposals as socio-technical imaginaries (Jasanoff and Kim,
2009). Such imaginaries are directly involved in the material transformation of social
realities, through sciences and technologies that are central to shaping human imagination
and political orders. Imagination is not the preserve of policymakers and politicians
advised by experts, but rather widely distributed among a nation’s citizens. Without citizens’
collective imagination, a “state may be, or may become, little more than an empty shell,
though possibly one with brutal and oppressive instruments at its command” (Jasanoff,
2004: 25–26).
Unfortunately, citizens’ collective imagination is not devoid of power asymmetries.
Diverse imaginations often compete or conflict with each other. Powerful actors attempt
to advance their visions over those of marginalised actors. In this way, promoted imagina-
ries work as “active exercises of power in selection of development priorities, allocation of
funds, and most importantly acceptance and suppression of political dissent” (Jasanoff and
Kim, 2009: 123). Thus, the power of imaginaries such as smart city proposals, helps realise
some social and material futures while marginalising others (Das, 2020; Gaffney and
Robertson, 2018; S€oderstr€om et al., 2014).
We make two contributions to the growing literature on smart cities. First, our novel
conceptual approach to smart cities as (un)democratic imaginaries, combines the envisioned
distribution of benefits with the articulation of diverse voices. Our approach can be used to
critically examine the (un)democratic making of smart imaginaries in other cities and of
alternative imaginaries like green and sustainable cities. Second, by studying the practice
of participatory forums and techniques used in the making of an ostensibly people-centred
and socially inclusive imaginary, we show how the city officials and their participation
consultants work as gatekeepers, by cherry-picking and translating some ideas out of a
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wide range of concerns and solutions offered by participating citizens. The selected ideas are
attached to, or are consistent with, technology-centred ‘global’ visions of smart urbanism.
Poor and marginalised residents often do not fit such visions. Their voices, interests and
knowledges are filtered out, which yields a ‘participatory’ process that puts democracy at the
service of technocracy.
The next section presents an overview of the literature on smart city developments, focus-
ing on questions of inclusion and participation. Then, we develop our conceptual approach
to imaginaries as distributive, participatory and responsive. ‘Methods: Documents and
interviews’ section provides a brief description of methods used for data collection. This is
followed by the ‘Analysis’ section. In the final section, we discuss our results and offer some
concluding reflections.
The ‘smartness’ of cities
Smart cities represent a digital turn in urban development (Datta, 2018; Wiig and Wyly,
2016: 487), aimed at ‘optimising’ cities using digital solutions developed by technology firms
and promoted by management consultants. Smart cities are criticised as technocratic
(Muggah, 2014; Ponting, 2013; Stapper et al., 2020), because technologies are sold as apo-
litical solutions to environmental problems such as air pollution and to complex social issues
of exclusion and inequality. Critics argue that smart solutions fail to address the needs of
poor and marginalised citizens (Das, 2020; Datta, 2015; Vanolo, 2013; Watson, 2014). By
catering primarily to middle- and high-income groups, smart solutions can thus worsen
social and economic inequalities (Das, 2020; Willis, 2019).
To counter this, Willis (2019) calls for closer attention to activities through which mar-
ginalised people meet their needs by using digital technologies and data. Such recognition is
argued to pave the way for marginalised people’s inclusion in the smart city. However, such
inclusion takes place in a wider neoliberal context where smart city visions are attached to
investments in ‘human capital’ (Caragliu et al., 2011; Neirotti et al., 2014), and inputs by
self-decisive, independent and aware citizens (Lara et al., 2016). Based on neoliberalism,
smart urbanism configures citizens as consumers of marketised services (Cardullo and
Kitchin, 2019). Smart cities assign new responsibilities to citizens and communities to
serve as sensing nodes providing (big) data to control centres (Gabrys, 2014; Vanolo,
2013). Yet, neoliberal smartness does not mean the elimination of red tapes, particularly
in India (Gupta, 2012). Smart city interventions involving e-governance continue to consti-
tute citizens through bureaucratic practices of form-filling and waiting-in-queues; thereby
deploying digital technology to make bureaucratic governance even more ubiquitous
(Datta, 2018).
Smart imaginaries are argued to marginalise citizens’ skills and innovations developed at
the grassroots (Boni et al., 2019; Calzada and Cobo, 2015). To tackle such social margin-
alisation, scholars call for a reorientation of ‘smartness’ from technologies to people
(Capdevila and Zarlenga, 2015; Vanolo, 2013). Rather than approaching cities as ‘sets of
actions and transactions’, which can be controlled using modern sciences and technologies
(Schindler and Marvin, 2018), ‘people-centred’ smart city proposals aim to harness the ‘col-
lective intelligence’, diverse knowledges of citizens (Gabrys, 2014; McFarlane and S€oderstr€om,
2017; Saunders and Baeck, 2015: 8, 44; Trencher, 2018). As they are embedded strongly within
communities, locally developed technologies are argued to produce more effective sustainabil-
ity outcomes than corporate-driven smart city imaginaries (Kummitha, 2020).
The move to people-centred smart cities is seen as challenging the ‘strange placelessness’
of smart city imaginaries that promote the same ‘solutions’ everywhere, from Singapore to
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Nairobi and beyond (Odendaal, 2021). People-centred smartness then means redirecting
attention to place-based complexity of social and ecological problems and of wider range
of actors working to address the problems (Bakıcı et al., 2013). As Kundu (2016: 100)
argues: “through their individual actions and collective practices, people are central to the
processes of place-making as they constantly reconfigure landscapes, things and possi-
bilities.” Critical in moves towards place-based people-centredness, is grappling with
power embedded in imaginaries that shape everyday life in smart cities (Datta and
Odendaal, 2019).
Addressing issues of power is central for working towards parity between all citizens’
agency (Blue et al., 2019), in developing people-centred smart city imaginaries through
participatory processes (Corsini et al., 2018). Many governments have now adopted citizen
participation in designing smart city visions (Cardullo and Kitchin, 2019; Kruks-Wisner,
2018). Participation can indeed facilitate transparency, collaboration and social learning
(Ferro et al., 2013; Luque et al., 2014). Often, however, participation can be governed by
powerful interests, rather than by the interests of the marginalised and poor (Das, 2020).
These interests can also be reproduced by consultants organising participatory forums
(Stapper et al., 2020), where participating citizens are passively brought on board for legit-
imation purposes (Raman, 2013).
The Indian National smart cities Mission promotes active participation by citizens
(Datta, 2018). Such forms of invited participation (Wynne, 2007), designed by government
institutions and their consultants, have earlier been attempted in Indian cities (Patel et al.,
2016). Many such participatory interventions were biased towards inviting the middle and
upper-middle classes (Coelho et al., 2013). They were marred by elite capture
(Chattopadhyay, 2015; Kundu, 2011; Zerah, 2009), under which the middle and upper-
middle classes consolidate their advantages in service delivery. These classes may also use
their voice, empowered through participatory governance, to vilify the poor residing in
informal settlements as threats to urban development (Chattopadhyay, 2015; Zerah,
2009). To tackle these challenges, engagement with grassroots NGOs, community-based
bodies with elected representatives, and women activists is considered crucial for effective
design of participatory spaces (Williams et al., 2018).
Unfortunately, despite effective design of participatory spaces in celebrated regional
contexts like Kerala, it can still be difficult to avoid the marginalisation of the least powerful
in the practice of participation (Williams et al., 2018). Many urban citizens in India can
show reluctance in communicating with others who are considered inferior on the basis of
caste, religion or class (Mahadevia et al., 2016). In general, it is difficult to find successful
examples of participatory urban governance, which are not marred by power asymmetries of
different kinds. It is therefore crucial to go beyond approaches to include or integrate poor
and marginalised people in smart governance, by instead approaching them as knowledge-
able “problem solvers” and creative innovators in their own right (Harriss, 2005; Pansera
and Sarkar, 2016). Solutions and innovations developed by the urban poor and marginal-
ised, can then help develop plural people-centred alternatives to technocratic smart cities
(Datta, 2018).
This raises the following questions: how can participatory governance engage with mar-
ginalised citizens and empower community initiatives, to nurture plural alternatives to
‘smart’ technocracy (Capdevila and Zarlenga, 2015)? How can participatory decision-
making ensure that the promised benefits of smart cities are accessible to the most margin-
alised citizens? Can smart cities be re-imagined as ‘democratic ecologies’ (Araya, 2015: 13),
in which possibilities are expanded for empowerment and bottom-up civic engagement,
enabling marginalised citizens to ‘co-produce public systems of governance’?
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Far from being general, answers to such questions are situated in specific contexts such as
that of Kolkata. Prominent among participatory urban governance initiatives in Kolkata
are planning programmes such as “Kolkata Urban Services for the Poor” and the develop-
ment plan of Kolkata’s twin city of Howrah (Bannerji, 2020). Historically, participation in
the city has gone hand in hand with the growth of ‘neoliberal urbanism’ across the country
(Chattopadhyay, 2017; Sengupta, 2013). This has meant that participatory agendas have
often lacked transparency, hidden real motives, and characterised by the unwillingness of
political leaders to go beyond ‘politics of patronisation’ (Cornea, 2020; Dasgupta, 2020).
Given these issues, the emphasis on participatory and inclusive smart city by the National
Mission guidelines, offered an opportunity for New Town Kolkata (NTK) to gain greater
legitimacy from its citizens and from wider political society.
Smart as (un)democratic?
Emphasising participation in techno-scientific developments such as smart cities, Jasanoff and
Kim (2015: 97) argue for ‘grassroots participation’ in which “local people need to be listened
to, not just “consulted” or “educated”.” This can mean delegating decision-making power to
citizens (Arnstein, 1969). To enable citizen-led transformations, it is argued that participatory
forums and techniques need to be sensitive and symmetrical towards diverse interests and
understandings (Stirling et al., 2007). To achieve this symmetry, the workings of power mean
that participatory forums and techniques need to enlarge the space for voices of the most
marginalised. Examples of participatory techniques include citizens’ juries (Pimbert and
Wakeford, 2002), hybrid forums (Callon et al., 2009), open space technology (Owen, 2008),
and deliberative mapping (Davies, 2006). These techniques differ in terms of how they address
relations of power structured around gender, class, bureaucratic, and expert-lay hierarchies.
To tackle power in participatory making of smart city imaginaries, dissenting and diver-
gent voices of (marginalised) citizens must be made central. For this purpose, we direct
attention to three aspects of a democratic imaginary: a) distributive, b) participatory, and c)
responsive. Key questions that emerge from this approach are outlined in Figure 1.
A smart city imaginary is distributive if its benefits are considered available to all citizens,
irrespective of their social group (concerning class, caste and gender). Building on theories
of distributive justice of actions (Vallentyne, 2007), here we aim to map whose needs the
• For whom is the smart city imagined, in 
terms of intended benefits?
• Does it take differences between cizen 
groups into account?
Distribuve
• Who is afforded the right to parcipate?
• Through what kind of methods is 
parcipaon enacted?
Parcipatory
• Whose voices are taken into account in the 
eventual smart city imaginary? 
• Are voices of the least powerful arculated 
into the imaginary?
Responsive
Figure 1. Questions emerging out of rethinking smart as (un)democratic.
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smart city is imagined as serving, and whose capabilities it is seen as developing. In unequal
cities, needs and knowledges of the poor and marginalised often diverge from those of the
middle and upper classes. For example, while the poor may demand access to clean drinking
water and safe cycling infrastructure, the middle and upper classes may desire gated com-
munities and elevated expressways. We ask if the smart city imaginary takes such differences
into account.
A smart city imaginary is participatory if (in its making) diverse groups of citizens, and
particularly those who are marginalised, are afforded opportunities to raise their voices
(Williams et al., 2018). By mapping the forums and techniques used by smart city planners
to enable citizen participation, we examine whether the participatory methods eventually
closed down decision-making processes, by excluding the marginalised and silencing the
messy diversity of voices (and interests), with the aim of arriving at an authoritative and
prescriptive proposal (Stirling, 2008).
A smart city imaginary is responsive if diverse citizens’ voices and knowledge, raised
through participatory methods, are taken into account by policymakers and other
decision-makers. This means that more marginalised voices are able to influence policies,
and that differences between citizens’ voices are articulated in the imaginary (de Hoop and
Arora, 2020; Williams et al., 2018), rather than classifying everyone under the homogenous
category of ‘citizen’ or ‘resident’. The crucial consideration here, is not whether citizens’
voices matter, but rather which voices are made to matter and how they help transform the
policymakers’ smart city imaginary. In particular, how are the voices of the least powerful
included by planners and policymakers? Does the latter inclusion open up space for plural
people-centred alternatives beyond the dominant smart city imaginary promoted by policy?
Methods: Documents and interviews
To map the smart city imaginaries produced at national and city levels, we rely on the
National Smart Cities: Mission Statement and Guidelines (MoUD, 2015), and on two ver-
sions of NTK’s proposal submitted to the national smart city challenge (NKDA, 2015a,
2016a). Winners of this challenge received funding and technical support from the national
government.
Each version of NTK’s proposal includes annexures containing minutes of official meet-
ings, copies of memoranda of understanding between the New Town Kolkata Development
Authority (NKDA) and other organisations, as well as details of citizen engagement pro-
cesses during proposal development (NKDA, 2015b, 2016b). We also analyse the feedback
provided by national government officials on the proposal’s first version (MoUD, 2016),
responding to which NTK authorities prepared the second version and annexures.
We complement the document analysis with 32 semi-structured interviews conducted
with policy practitioners, middle class as well as marginalised citizens in Kolkata (see
Figure 2 for location of interviews). We asked the citizens about their smart city aspirations
as well as how, where, when they were consulted in the process. With (transport and urban
development) policy practitioners, we tried eliciting how they organised participation pro-
cesses, what imaginaries of urban mobility exist for the smart city and how they made
decisions on the inclusion/exclusion of citizens’ voices into NTK’s final smart city proposal.
Our interviewees included a senior city official planning urban transformation in NTK;
an urban planner critical of land use planning and design of the city before the smart city
era; and a private consultant who helped the government draft smart city plans. We inter-
viewed three middle-class citizens who represented their residential communities in partic-
ipatory consultations for developing NTK’s smart imagery. We also conducted short
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interviews with twenty marginalised people including rickshaw pullers, autorickshaw driv-
ers, roadside vendors, fruit and vegetable sellers, cleaners and construction workers, who
offered valuable insights into their everyday practices as well as problems with the smart city
imaginary. About half of them informed that they were not aware of citizen consultations,
another half were aware and were invited to ‘focus groups’ but didn’t have the time or
willingness to go for what they considered to be ‘fancy events’.
Analysis
NTK is located on the north-eastern fringe of the central district of Kolkata, India. Until the
early 1990s, it was primarily a rural area supporting agricultural and pastoral activities.
NTK was originally planned as a modern business district, with residential quarters for
roughly one million people (NKDA, 2016c). Private developers invested in housing and
commercial sectors, mainly for the (upper) middle classes (Bose, 2014: 392). Around 200
rural households were displaced from their (agricultural) lands to make way for NTK.
According to official reports, displaced people were offered ‘a rehabilitation and resettle-
ment package in accordance with norms of Government of India and State government’
(HIDCO, 1999: 8). The stated visions for NTK’s development in the 1990s were ‘modern’
efficiency, aesthetic attractiveness and environmental sustainability (HIDCO, 1999). The
overarching ambition was to make NTK a regional and national financial hub
(Hochadel, 2016). On this ambition is overlaid the new smart city imaginary.
NTK covers an area of 35.5 sq. km, comprised of residential ‘gated’ apartments over-
looking agricultural lands adjoining the city. The surrounding rural communities act as
‘service villages’, supplying ‘servants, housekeepers, drivers, cleaners, cooks’ to NTK’s
urban residents (Kundu, 2016: 96). The main administrative body organising local services
and amenities is the New Town Kolkata Development Authority (NKDA). The central
planning agency for overall urban development is the Housing Infrastructure
Figure 2. Map of New town Kolkata (red border) and surroundings, marked with sites for interviews and
document collection (green circles). Source: Google maps, accessed 14th March 2021.
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Development Corporation (HIDCO). NKDA and HIDCO took the lead in preparing
NTK’s proposal for the national Smart City Challenge, using inputs from firms like
IBM, SAP, Oracle, Wipro, Shapoorji Pallonji, and Intel (NKDA, 2015a: 49). Future
Cities Catapult, a UK-based consulting firm, helped organise citizen engagement. In devel-
oping the proposal’s mobility components, representatives from West Bengal’s state
Transport Department were involved.
As an imaginary, NTK’s proposal promises to prepare the city for economic and demo-
graphic growth, offering its citizens the ‘best in class urban living experience’ (NKDA,
2015a: 16). Other promises include becoming a ‘global’ services hub by attracting new
tech companies, setting up hospitals and higher education institutions, as well as offering
citizens opportunities for better work-life balance by hosting entertainment centres, parks
and museums. The proposal emphasises the goals to be achieved in accordance with the
National Mission guidelines, including IT connectivity, e-governance and mechanisms for
active citizen participation in the smart city’s decision-making processes (NKDA, 2015a:
16–17). In the following we ask if the proposal as democratic as it claims to be.
A ‘distributive’ imaginary?
The National Mission calls for ‘sustainable and inclusive’ development, to improve quality
of life, employment opportunities and incomes for everyone, but particularly ‘the poor and
the disadvantaged’ (MOHUA, 2017). In addition, the National Mission guidelines for pre-
paring smart city proposals state that: “applying smart solutions in the transport sector
(Intelligent traffic management system) and reducing average commute time or cost to
citizens will have positive effects on productivity and quality of life of citizens” (MoUD,
2015: 8). Here, two issues are worth highlighting.
First, the smart solutions are assumed to be beneficial a priori, for citizens’ productivity
and quality of life. This marginalises all uncertainties. All possible hurdles experienced in
‘implementing’ smart urbanism are effectively ignored. These hurdles can include problems
in procuring the ‘smart’ technologies, securing the necessary land, and developing the req-
uisite skills. Any adverse effects of the technologies, on the environment and on vulnerable
people are also not considered.
Second, the smart solutions are assumed to benefit all citizens’ productivity and quality
of life. Differences with respect to class, gender, caste, age, disability, and neighbourhood
are not considered. For instance, technologies like smart parking systems mainly benefit
people who own cars. Poor people are more likely to benefit from safe bicycling infrastruc-
ture or a low-cost public transport system that connects their homes with workplaces.
Following the National Mission guidelines, NTK’s proposal frames transport in a smart
city to be ‘plentiful and attractive to people of all income levels’ (NKDA, 2015b). This
erasure of differences and inequalities from the proposal depoliticises NTK’s smart city
imaginary. Many people in NTK earn their living from driving rickshaws, vending fruits
and vegetables from pushcarts, labouring on construction sites, working as security guards
in flats and offices, and cleaning and cooking as domestic ‘servants’ in the middle- and
upper-class homes. Some of these workers live in the city. Others commute from surround-
ing villages. Nearly all of them use public transport services, roads and other infrastructure
on a daily basis. How are their specific needs attended to, in NTK’s smart city proposal?
NTK proposes to build a ‘hawkers’ corner’ or a community marketplace for small and
marginal vendors ‘to set up shop in an organised manner’, instead of using pushcarts to sell
at their customers’ doorstep (NKDA, 2015a: 42, 43). Such initiatives are publicised as
attempts to offer ‘safe spaces’ for these vendors, as part of the city’s efforts to be inclusive
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(following the National Mission). However, notes from meetings held in February 2016
reveal a not-so-inclusive logic behind this initiative. The ‘hawkers’ corner’ was considered as
a response to the “increasing menace of encroachment of roadside public places by
hawkers,” which was seen as creating “nuisance by littering of waste in adjoining roads &
footpaths and visual pollution,” while “also hampering free flow of traffic in service roads”
(NKDA, 2016b: Annexure 4: 12). The smart city thus aimed to control the vendors in an
enclosed ‘hawkers’ corner’. As one of our respondents notes, ‘it was [considered] essential to
remove them from eye-sight in order to present New Town as a clean and smart city’. This
smart initiative is also unsatisfactory for many middle-class residents who considered the
designated ‘corner’ as a distant and inconvenient location to shop from.
Another ostensibly ‘pro-poor’ intervention is the introduction of the Toto (a battery-
operated rickshaw), proposed to create new employment opportunities. By simplifying the
bureaucratic process of acquiring a driving licence and vehicle registration, low-income
individuals are encouraged to own and drive a Toto (as a mode of shared/public transport)
for a living. However, the overarching goal here appears to be the promotion of deregula-
tion and marketisation of transport, as exemplified by this statement from an interview with
a government official:
I believe in market mechanisms. Market regulates the price and creates entry and exit barriers. Let
us [government] not put additional barriers.
Perhaps to address criticisms of such neoliberal approaches that can exacerbate inequality
and poverty (Datta, 2018; Praharaj et al., 2018), NTK’s proposal couches them in the
language of ‘pro-poor’ inclusiveness.
The same neoliberal thrust is wrapped up in citizen choice and inclusion in the NTK
imaginary’s promotion of bicycling. Here, differences among citizens are acknowledged by
considering that bicycling might not work for all citizens. As noted by a city official:
We are not advocating that everyone should start bicycling or people should bike to work . . . cycles
will never be popular among elderly citizens, but we are not suggesting one size fits all strategy.
Citizens with different needs and choices will be able to choose what suits him/her most.
This consideration of difference, however, fails to be distributive. It does not take seriously
the needs of the poor and marginalised. For the latter, bicycling is often not a choice, but the
only mode of transportation that they can afford to use, on roads that are extremely dan-
gerous for bicyclists (Ghosh and Sharmeen, 2021). But rather than proposing to build
dedicated infrastructure for safe bicycling, the government’s smart neoliberal strategy
shifts the risk and responsibility of bicycling to individualised citizens who are seen as
making a choice. Thus framed through the act of choosing, differences between citizens
are evaded, as they all become potential consumers of the smart city (cf. Burri, 2015: 244).
A ‘participatory’ smart city imaginary?
The National Mission guidelines highlight citizen participation as crucial to smart city
proposal development:
“The proposal will be citizen-driven from the beginning, achieved through citizen consultations,
including active participation of groups of people, such as Residents Welfare Associations,
Taxpayers Associations, Senior citizens and Slum Dwellers Associations. During consultations,
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issues, needs and priorities of citizens and groups of people will be identified and citizen-driven
solutions generated.” (MoUD, 2015: 22 emphasis added)
The guidelines also call for engagement with “vulnerable sections of society (disabled, chil-
dren, elderly etc.), ward committees and area sabhas (neighbourhood councils), important
citizens groups (associations, organisations and institutions such as local chamber of
commerce)” (MoUD, 2015: 35). In this call for engagement with the vulnerable, differences
based on power asymmetries of class, caste and gender are once again obscured.
The National mission guidelines emphasise the use of digital technologies for citizen
participation, by asking: “how much of social media, community, mobile governance have
been used during citizen consultation?” (MoUD, 2015: 35 emphasis added). Even for achiev-
ing the ostensibly people-centred citizen participation, the national government’s smart city
imaginary is centred on digital technologies. While restricting participation to those who are
adept with digital technologies, this technology-centred framing may be geared towards
promoting the contracting of private firms to design and implement “tools for tailor-
making stakeholder engagement” (Corsini et al., 2018: 6).
Attempting to adhere to the National Mission guidelines, NTK’s proposal highlights the
‘quantity’ of participation, stating that the city:
“engaged with around 83% of the residing population (29880 residents) to obtain their feedback
on city profile and understand their aspirations, visions and goals. Approximately 21% of
respondents (7560 persons) provided inputs for formulating the Smart City Plan through 138
events.” (NKDA, 2016a: 19)
The proposal categorised participants as follows:
“Respondents included – senior citizens, housewives, students, professionals including IT
employees, informal sector workers, children, non-resident property owners, citizens seeking
to relocate to New Town in near future, entrepreneurs, developers, businessmen, city admin-
istrators, elected representatives, academicians and other government institutions along with
visitors to the city” (NKDA, 2016a: 19)
As these categories indicate, the imaginary is focused on reaching out to middle-class citizens
in different professions. Distinct efforts to bring on board the voices of poor and marginalised
Figure 3. Citizens’ Groups targeted in the Consultation Process. Source: NKDA 2016b: 3.2.1 Open access.
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people are missing from the picture. Yet the proposal does seem to take class and gender
differences into account through the identification of ‘focus groups’ of citizens. As depicted in
Figure 3, focus groups included poorer people primarily in the fifth category of those
employed in the ‘informal sectors’. An emphasis on women workers is noted in the third
category of ‘professionals’. Interestingly, ‘housewives’ are included as a separate category.
During interviews, our respondents offered useful insights into ‘who participated’ in the
smart city consultations. One interviewee observed that a middle-class family including
senior citizens, male and female professionals, children, domestic workers, cooks, nannies
and pets was generally represented by a single male member of the family. Women only
attended the meetings if male family members could not attend, or if male members con-
sidered the meetings to be ‘childish endeavours’ not worth attending. Another interviewee
described how a few enthusiastic (often retired) male residents, held in high esteem by local
government officials due to their successful professional careers, were personally invited to
the consultation sessions. Clearly, these influential people were not the marginalised, vul-
nerable citizens that the National Mission guidelines had emphasised.
Each participating residential community, such as the residents’ welfare association of a
neighbourhood, selected a representative to attend the NTKDA meetings and workshops.
This representative was generally middle class rather than a poor resident of the neighbour-
hood (as has been observed in other experiments with participatory urban governance in
Indian cities: Chattopadhyay, 2015; Kundu, 2011). Before the participatory gatherings in
NTK, some representatives collected ideas from other residents, or wrote up their own ideas
and validated the same with other residents of the community. Recalling one meeting for
representatives of a residents’ welfare associations, one respondent noted:
“After an introductory speech by the chair, we were showed some video clips (of smart cities
around the world). We were then asked to propose any ideas and opinions about making New
Town a smart city.”
With the help of the introductory speech and video of other smart cities, the ‘participatory’
meeting was framed by the concerns and goals of NKDA officials. Beginning with a readymade
audio-visualmessage can orient citizens’ focus away from their local issues and concerns, towards
policy aspirations and towards “roles carved out for them in policy narratives” (Hoekstra, 2019:
483), aimed at realising a ‘world’ city that meets global standards (Burns et al., 2021).
In contrast to the paucity of information on ‘who actually participated’ in achieving the
ostensible goal of co-creating the imaginary, NTK’s proposal is replete with details
about the methods used for citizen participation. A wide variety of techniques were used,
as listed in Table 1.
Most methods listed in Table 1, such as the distribution of flyers, help desks, and regularly
updated website, communicate information to citizens rather than co-producing the smart city
imaginary with them. There is also a clear bias towards online media for citizen engagement.
Such a bias ends up excluding those citizens who do not operate a digital device. Yet, many
citizens were heard through face-to-face forums such as focus group discussions and work-
shops (NKDA, 2016b: 3.2.2). Unfortunately, NTK’s smart city documents do not describe
these forums’ design or outcome. The quantity of participation is thus highlighted, without
providing an explanation of content and quality. Unsurprisingly, therefore, many of our
respondents claimed that (marginalised) citizens cannot be considered as having co-
produced the imaginary.
Without two-way communication between citizens and city officials, participation is
reduced largely to (elite, digitally savvy) citizens’ access to information provided by smart
Ghosh and Arora 11
Table 1. Methods used for citizen engagement in 2015–2016.
Method Outreach
Suggestions about smart initiatives received online 188
Online discussion about smart city vision 396
Online submission about smart city initiatives 577
Online registrations on MyGov app 20,000
Online votes on smart initiatives through MyGov website –
Essays about a smart city and vision statements received 165
Emails 15,000 sent out
SMS 10,000 sent out, connecting 9,600þ
households
Facebook 17,500þ followers; 150þ posts and
comments; 2,500þ likes
Twitter 200 followers; 100þ tweets and
retweets
YouTube 27 videos; 800þ views
WhatsApp social media group –
Dropbox facility –
NKDA website regularly updated –
Focus Group discussion and workshops for visioning and
idea exchange camps
4,876 attended
Two-day workshop conducted by Future Cities Catapult
and BuroHappold consulting, UK, on 29–30 September
2015
–
Offline polls (surveys with citizens) for smart solutions 1,000
Competition among citizens for best smart city vision –
‘Smart Fridays’ organised at NKDA offices for discussing
vision/ goals and co-creating innovative solutions
—
Offline votes on smart initiatives Varying percentages from different
neighbourhoods
Survey with citizens 5,000 distributed, 314 received
Smart City Cycleathon: bicycle rally 1,200þ participants – enthusiastic
response later cited as evidence that
an appetite for cycling existed if
adequate infrastructure is in place
Smart helpdesks and city-wide kiosks 7,193 offline suggestions received
‘Masti ka Caravan’ (Caravan of fun) – travelling to different
residences, commercial areas and offices
Unknown
Sit and draw competition for children asked to envision
their ‘dream city’
100þ participants
Other events (with smart city kiosks for information dis-
semination and exchange), during the Durga Puja and
other festivals
138
Publication of information brochure and citizen involvement
procedure
Unknown
Radio programmes like ‘Innovative Fridays’ – a talk show for
eliciting innovative ideas from citizens
–
Distribution of flyers Unknown
–Not included.
Sources: NKDA (2015a); NKDA (2015b); NKDA (2016a); NKDA (2016b); MyGov (2019).
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city promoters. Voices of dissent and citizens’ divergent interests are marginalised, which
closes down the development of the imaginary. As we document in detail below, the final
proposal remains largely within the bounds of technocratic smartness as imagined by urban
planners/administrators and their partners in tech firms and consultancies. This is also
reflected in the proposal’s emphasis on the consultants who organised participation on
behalf of the city, instead of the voices of thousands of local citizens who were counted
as participants. Ultimately, while citizen participation was counted as significant in terms of
numbers, the actual impact of people’s voices appears to have been limited.
A ‘responsive’ smart city imaginary?
Having an avenue to participate does not necessarily ensure that citizens actually influence
the eventual imaginary. Our conversations with NKDA officials revealed that the informa-
tion gathered from citizens was reviewed, ‘cleaned up’, and some ideas were cherrypicked
out of the received input. This turned NTK policymakers into gatekeepers, who not only
framed the design and practice of citizen engagement (as detailed above), but also controlled
the influx of ideas. Enacting this control, they accepted some ideas as relevant for the
proposal, while discarding others. Therefore, only a small selection of the voices raised by
citizens is articulated in the final proposal.
The National Mission guidelines emphasise the articulation of citizens’ voices, by asking:
“How well does the vision come out of the needs, aspirations and wishes of the local people to
make their city more liveable?” (MoUD, 2015: 33). “Do the goals flow from visions identified
through citizen consultation?” (MoUD, 2015: 34). The guidelines call for the inclusion of
“details of [the] process for co-creating every step (ideas, strategies, implementing mechanism
and financial solutions) through an extensive consultation process” (MoUD, 2015: 35).
The first version of NTK’s proposal does not respond to these questions. It provides only
a brief description of the different citizen engagement methods used. It does nevertheless
claim that the smart city vision was collectively imagined, incorporating citizens’ inputs,
without specifying which inputs were incorporated and how. The second revised version of
the proposal is more detailed in representing citizens’ voices. An example of this is shown in
Figure 4, which details citizen feedback on mobility. The figure shows that ‘walkability’ and
‘transport’ each constituted 10% of the total citizen responses (NKDA, 2016a: 48). Under
transport, the citizens’ emphasis is overwhelmingly on public transport, both concerning the
expansion of options, pan-city connections and last-mile connectivity (between a bus or
metro stop and the passenger’s office or home). How do these citizens’ concerns align with
the smart mobility initiatives and solutions included in NTK’s proposal?
Indeed, many of the mobility initiatives proposed are consistent with citizens’ emphasis.
Below is a list of such proposed initiatives (NKDA, 2016a: 27):
1. five smart bus stands and one smart bus terminus;
2. a carpooling programme;
3. a cycling project;
4. 145 km of pedestrian-friendly pathways and citizens’ plaza;
5. nine smart parking lots;
6. an app for autorickshaws/Totos;
7. 30 autorickshaw/Toto stands with charging station, waiting area, water fountains and
other amenities;
8. mono-rail and sky trains;
9. bike-sharing facilities;
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10. eight new metro stations and a ‘multi-modal transport hub’ in each metro station, to
‘create seamless transport connectivity across [different] public transport modes’
(NKDA, 2016b: 3.7.2).
In the proposed initiatives, however, digital technologies are nearly always central.
Mobility is imagined in the form of technologies like the ‘smart auto-Toto app’, ‘bus loca-
tor’ and ‘app for ride pooling’ (NTKDA, 2016b: 3.7.2). From citizens’ feedback (Figure 4),
it is clear that the use of digital services in mobility was not a citizen concern. Digital
technologies were instead imagined by planners and experts involved in proposal develop-
ment. Officials took pride in offering digital solutions and admitted that these initiatives are
aimed at making NTK a ‘world-class city’ (cf. Burns et al., 2021; Roy, 2011: 259). As noted
by an official we interviewed:
“if people in New York enjoy certain facilities, why would people in India not have those
facilities?”
The official’s statement indicates that NTK’s smart imaginary is not simply driven by local
needs and citizens’ voices. If ‘globality’ of a city like New York is centred on digital tech-
nology, then clearly there is a tension between that aspiration and an imaginary that is
responsive towards the needs and knowledges of the city’s residents, particularly the most
marginalised among them (Bose, 2014; Burns et al., 2021). Rather than directly addressing
citizens’ needs of accessible public transport, safe pedestrian and bicycling infrastructure,
NTK officials translated citizens’ voices into the promotion of digital technologies following
‘global’ smart imaginaries (Wiig and Wyly, 2016: 488).
The revised version of NTK’s proposal contains a critical annexure titled ‘Model
“Liveable” Neighbourhood’, which attempts to articulate the needs and challenges of
living in the city, voiced by three anonymised NTK citizens (NKDA, 2016b: 3.6.5).
Following a suggestion by the UK-based consultancy, Future Cities Catapult, NTK officials
selected one young woman (aged 27, who had recently moved back to India after living
abroad), one middle-aged man (aged 55, working in a private firm) and a senior citizen
(male, aged 74, retired, middle class).
The woman’s concerns focus on the lack of walking and cycling infrastructure, poor air
quality and lack of safety in the neighbourhoods. The middle-aged man is concerned about
access to doctors, health facilities and markets for food, while the senior citizen emphasises
the need for last-mile connectivity using para-transit modes and public spaces for commu-
nity gatherings (NKDA, 2016b: 3.6.5). Mobility is central to all three citizens’ concerns.
Figure 4. Citizen Feedback on Mobility Issues in NTK’s Smart City Proposal. Source: NKDA 2016b: 3.2.2
Open access.
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While the articulation of the three citizens’ concerns is useful, the proposal does not describe
why these citizens were selected and how representative their articulations were of the
concerns of poor and marginalised women and men living and working in NTK. Instead,
this exercise of articulating citizens’ testimonies appears to have helped tick a box in the
National Mission’s proposal preparation guidelines (NKDA, 2016a: 90).
In order to grasp NTK’s responsiveness to citizens’ needs, two observations are crucial.
First, engagement exercises aimed to gather citizens’ concerns regarding their perceived
needs and challenges of living in NTK, rather than any innovative solutions and initiatives
based on the citizens’ own knowledge and experience. The imagination of all initiatives and
solutions was thus solely the preserve of ‘official’ smart city promoters (including urban
planners, policymakers, hired consultants and tech firms). In fact, participation can help
pave the way for city officials to present their predetermined priorities as smart solutions to
the concerns raised by citizens.
Second, considering that only three citizens’ voices were highlighted in the revised version
of the proposal, it is likely that the solutions proposed by the urban planners and policy-
makers were not responses to diverse citizens’ concerns at all. Instead, the latter concerns
may have been selected, filtered out of a diversity of citizen inputs (see above), to include in
the proposal because they were consistent with the technological solutions that the
planners and policymakers had already defined and incorporated into the smart city imag-
inary. Thus, it may be technological solutionism that governs the development of NTK’s
smart city imaginary even when it is attempting to be responsive towards citizens’ concerns.
To map some voices that are not included in the proposal, we requested our interviewees
to narrate their concerns and solutions (focussing on transport and mobility), which they
raised earlier during face-to-face consultations with city officials and their consultants.
Citizens narrated concerns and solutions such as traffic congestion, improvements to city
roads, good public transport and communication. They also included some specific sugges-
tions such as escalator and lift services in metro stations; safe, well-lit and clean underpasses
for walking and crossing busy roads; direct bus connectivity to all parts of central Kolkata
as well as higher frequency and more reliable public bus services. These concerns and
solutions show that smart urban mobility is not necessarily driven by apps or other digital
technologies. Citizens focus instead on the reliability, accessibility and convenience of good
public transport infrastructure.
The middle-class citizens we interviewed proudly noted that the chair of the NKDA
readily accepted their proposals in consultation meetings. NKDA officials also informed
us that citizens’ viewpoints in many cases helped them reframe smart city strategies. As one
city official notes, “normally we wouldn’t have given priority to walkability, but citizens’
feedback showed us [new] directions to allocate our limited budget.” This indicates that the
policymakers and planners were open to at least some alternative directions of smartness
highlighted by upper- and middle-class citizens. Yet, officials also clarify that citizens’ voices
only mattered when they ‘made sense’. As observed by a city official:
“Often citizens’ concern is their immediate neighbourhood; they would hardly ever reflect on an
overall aggregate strategic planning. If you listen too much to citizens’ views, you go nowhere.
You need to take control and do strategic planning.”
Thus, rather than considering citizens’ belongingness to their neighbourhoods as important
for co-producing a smart city imaginary (Stapper et al., 2020), the official is disdainful
towards supposedly local concerns of citizens. Such disdain does not bode well for the
inclusion of divergent and dissenting citizens’ voices in NTK’s smart city imaginary. The
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same disdain and the associated “need to take control” may also be reasons why the
proposal’s final version includes only those citizens’ voices that are in alignment with the
technological solutions considered smart by NTK officials and their consultants.
In general, NTK’s smart city proposal is responsive to some voices belonging to the
middle- and higher-income citizens who may be employed in (or retired from) prestigious
government jobs, own a flat in one of the expensive gated communities, and/or possess
connections with (international) businesses. Voices of poor and marginalised people are
absent in the imaginary. Such voices are thus systemically excluded. Although the partici-
patory development of the imaginary included focus group consultation with the so-called
informal sector, and the imaginary articulated a smart initiative of “organised vending zones
for 600 informal vendors” (NKDA, 2016a: 43), this initiative was not co-produced with
poor and marginalised people working in the ‘informal’ sector.
Discussion and conclusions
Our analysis shows that New Town Kolkata’s smart city imaginary largely failed to be
distributive. It rarely accounted for the specific needs of poorer and vulnerable citizens.
In the event where needs of poor citizens were highlighted, such as in the promotion of
the battery-operated Toto, they served as a ruse for neoliberal marketisation of public
services, confirming the historical rise of neoliberalism in Kolkata and beyond (Sengupta,
2013).
City authorities invested considerable effort in using participatory methods for citizen
engagement. However, citizen participation was governed by:
• top-down framing of the design and practice of participation, often prioritising one-way
digital communication, consistent with technocratic and globalising teleology of smart
cities;
• dominating influence of middle- and upper-classes, rather than poor and marginalised
citizens;
• an emphasis on the ‘quantity of participation’ rather than on its quality; and
• focus on identifying citizens’ needs and concerns rather than their knowledge-production
and innovation initiatives. While citizen-led articulation of problems has real potential
for democratising urban planning (Calzada, 2018), NTK missed opportunities to co-
produce the imaginary with citizens. Also, possibilities for citizens to challenge the con-
tent of the imaginary were not nurtured.
People in-charge of developing the imaginary were responsive to some middle-class citi-
zens’ voices. Consistent with these voices, plural alternative smart solutions were proposed,
such as walkability and cycling. However, citizens’ concerns and solutions articulated in the
proposal, were generally tied to digital technologies. In general, aspirations to be ‘world-
class’ smart and accompanying technological solutionism appear to have provided the basis
for officials’ filtering and cherry-picking particular issues, out of the wide range of citizen
inputs that were received. Participatory democratic exercises were thus put at the service of
technocracy and control (cf. Arora et al. 2020).
By excluding citizens’ voices that diverged from official technocratic visions of ‘global’
smart urbanism, a messy diversity of citizens’ voices was closed down in the making of the
smart city imaginary (despite its emphatic celebration of citizen engagement). Thus excluded
were voices, interests and knowledges of the city’s low-income groups, including people who
live or work as maids, vendors and construction workers. Such exclusion has been observed
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across other participatory urban governance efforts in Indian cities (e.g., Chattopadhyay,
2015; Williams et al., 2018). Participation is also observed to be biased towards the middle
and upper-middle classes (Coelho et al., 2013; Patel et al., 2016). In the foregoing, we have
shown how management of participation and its deployment to legitimise top-down official
visions (Raman, 2013; Stapper et al., 2020; Zerah, 2009), plays out in practice as city
officials and their hired consultants filter and favour those concerns that appear aligned
with technology-centred visions of smart urbanism.
To develop imaginaries that are genuinely responsive to the needs and knowledges of its
marginalised citizens, modern technologies developed and sold by large corporations must
be decentred, and grassroots innovations and practices must be foregrounded (Boni et al.,
2019). The latter innovations and practices offer plural alternatives enabled by poor and
marginalised citizens, which are crucial for truly people-centred and democratic smart cities.
Finally, our conceptual framework focused on distributive, participatory, and responsive
imaginaries, can help scrutinize sociotechnical developments for smartness or sustainability,
as more or less (un)democratic. A growing literature shows that poor and marginalised
citizens do not fit ‘smart’ visions of marketized technocratic development, particularly in
highly unequal cities like Kolkata. Contributing to this literature, we have shown how unfit-
ting voices are excluded and controlled in practice, even within ostensibly participatory and
inclusive developments, by policymakers and consultants playing the role of gatekeepers.
However, our contribution is valuable only if it helps deepen democracy in urban governance,
by transforming smart and sustainable imaginaries to be based on the voices/knowledges and
innovations produced by poor and marginalised citizens. Without such a democratic trans-
formation, smartness is likely to remain a metaphor for neoliberal technocracy.
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